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Introduction
Lending patterns in mortgage markets have been the focal point of many recent policy
debates. Observed disparities in these patterns have led to such federal regulations as the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA). Statistical analysis, in particular, has fueled the debate over the existence of
racial redlining in mortgage lending, both ‘‘proving’’ and ‘‘disproving’’ that racial
redlining exists, depending on which analysis is used. In this paper, we analyze the major
approaches that have been used in the analysis of racial redlining to determine their
usefulness in providing statistical evidence on this issue.
So far, the evidence of redlining in neighborhoods has been conﬁned to single-
equation, reduced-form models of mortgage credit ﬂows (Holmes and Horvitz, 1994;
Perle, Lynch and Horner, 1993). We show that these models, similar to those used in
virtually all previous research, are unable to attribute neighborhood characteristics to
demand or supply. To highlight the weakness of single-equation models, we ﬁrst estimate
several single-equation models of mortgage credit ﬂows in the Washington, DC
metropolitan area, each increasing in statistical sophistication. As we move from model
to model, using the same data, we show that the statistical evidence that appears in one
model then disappears in a subsequent model. Such reversals are due to model
speciﬁcation errors that arise from not taking into account the countervailing effects of
differences in supply and demand.
To correct for this, we estimate a simultaneous equation model and, for the ﬁrst time,
are able to analyze differences in the supply of and demand for mortgatge credit by the
racial make-up of a community. We ﬁnd results that are consistent with racial redlining
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Abstract. Statistical analyses of mortgage redlining at the neighborhood level have fueled
the debate over the existence of racial redlining in mortgage lending, both ‘‘proving’’ and
‘‘disproving’’ that redlining exists, depending upon the type of model used. In this paper, we
compare results of different statistical models using data for the Washington, DC
metropolitan area to determine their usefulness in providing statistical evidence on this
issue. After demonstrating the sensitivity of single-equation models to speciﬁcation error,
we estimate a simultaneous equations model of mortgage credit ﬂows. This model makes it
possible to analyze differences in the supply and demand for mortgage credit by the racial
composition of the community. We conclude that most, if not all, statistical evidence of
racial redlining based on aggregate loan data is at best inconclusive, and more likely,
misleading.by lenders. However, these results are also consistent with differences in creditworthiness
that others have found in individual loan-level analyses.
We ﬁnd the statistical evidence on racial redlining to be extremely sensitive to the way
the analysis is performed, and its reliability entirely dependent on the completeness of the
data used. We conclude that most, if not all, statistical evidence of racial redlining based
on aggregate loan data is at best inconclusive and more likely, misleading. There seems to
be an unusually large gap between what is claimed about the statistical evidence on racial
redlining and what can be justiﬁed by the actual analyses.
Testing for Redlining Based on Mortgage Flows
Racial redlining, according to the law, is deﬁned as the refusal by a lender to offer
credit to a particular community based on the racial make-up of the neighborhood.
Courts have determined that racial redlining violates the Fair Housing Act. In an
economic context, Becker (1971) deﬁnes discrimination as the situation wherein ﬁrms or
individuals are willing to forego proﬁtable opportunities to satisfy their ‘‘taste for
discrimination.’’ Under the Becker paradigm, redlining would occur if ﬁrms avoided
making proﬁtable loans to applicants from minority neigborhoods. For Becker,
discrimination must have a demonstrable economic cost.
Models of mortgage credit ﬂows attempt to measure differences in mortgage
originations among neighborhoods. Most of these aggregate-level models are built upon
the notion that the number of loans originated in a neighborhood, usually at the census
tract level, can be explained by various proxies for demand and supply. A negative and
statistically signiﬁcant relation between percent minority in the neighborhood and the
number of mortgages originated is often seen as ‘‘proof’’ of racial discrimination
(Holmes and Horvitz, 1994). This result is interpreted as showing that as the percentage
minority in a neighborhood increases, the ratio of originations to salable properties falls.
For example, in a statistical analysis of mortgage lending patterns in Boston over
1982–1987, Bradbury, Case and Dunham (1989) report regression results that include a
statistically signiﬁcant negative impact from the percentage black in the neighborhood.
In other words, they ﬁnd that signiﬁcantly fewer mortgage loans were originated in black
neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods, even after controlling for some economic
and other non-racial factors. Whether this type of ﬁnding constitutes evidence of racial
redlining is the subject of much debate.
Perle, Lynch and Horner (1993) claim that aggregate level analyses of mortgage credit
ﬂows cannot identify redlining due to problems associated with model structure and
speciﬁcation, data limitations, and overaggregation. To demonstrate these problems, the
authors estimate single-equation models of varying complexity for the Detroit metro-
politan statistical area (MSA). The results associated with the racial composition variable
are not robust across speciﬁcations. Speciﬁc to the problem of single-equation estimation,
the authors lament that ‘‘one cannot attribute lower lending levels in minority areas to
supply or demand effects. Simply put, reduced-form estimation cannot adequately
discern supply-related redlining.’’
More recently, Holmes and Horvitz estimated a census tract-level model of mortgage
credit ﬂows for the Houston MSA. Their model included a number of independent
variables intended to proxy for demand-side effects which might otherwise be correlated
with race and hence, give a misleading indication that redlining occurs. The major
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loans in an area such as the foreclosure rate on government-insured mortgages, and the
change in home prices. The authors ﬁnd that in estimating the model without the risk
variables, the percent black variable was negative and statistically signiﬁcant. However,
upon estimation of the model with the risk factors included, the racial composition
variable was no longer signiﬁcant. Although the inclusion of these proxies for risk
represents a useful extension to mortgage credit ﬂow studies, it still suffers from a
misspeciﬁcation problem. We address that deﬁciency by providing a formal justiﬁcation
for adopting a simultaneous equations approach to estimating mortgage credit ﬂows and
empirical results from single-equation models and a simultaneous system of demand and
supply for mortgage credit.
The Case for Simultaneity  
To date, efforts to analyze mortgage credit ﬂows at the neighborhood level have done so
using single-equation reduced-form models. These models can be generalized as follows;
BASE (1)
where SL is the supply of mortgage credit to neighborhood L, ORIG is the number of
loan originations in a census tract, UNITS is the number of residential properties in the
neighborhood,  RACE is a variable indicating the racial composition of the
neighborhood,  X are variables affecting supply, and Z are variables affecting demand. In
this model, demand is assumed to be exogenously determined. Holmes and Horvitz used
this approach in modeling redlining in Houston. However, the assumption that demand
is exogenous oversimpliﬁes the nature of the mortgage market. Rachlis and Yezer (1993),
for example, conceptualize the mortgage lending decision in a four-equation simul-
taneous framework. Rachlis and Yezer claim that separate equations should be estimated
for choosing a lender, applying for a mortgage, endorsement of the loan, and ﬁnally loan
default. The authors in this case do not empirically estimate this model due to the lack of
data.
Maddala and Trost (1982) actually estimated a simultaneous model of mortgage credit
on a loan-level basis in Columbia, South Carolina. Their model related demand and
supply to a set of explanatory variables, including applicant race, and the interest rate on
the loan. They argued that estimating models of loan rejection rates obfuscates the
relationship of explanatory factors to supply or demand. As a result, such models cannot
distinguish whether differences in lending patterns across neighborhoods are supply or
demand-related. Single-equation models such as (1) suffer from this problem. By
estimating equation (1) without estimating simultaneously an equation for the demand
for mortgage credit, the model results in inconsistent and biased estimates of the
parameters. To see this, assume that the actual model of mortgage credit ﬂows take the
following form:
BASE (2a)
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where DR is the demand for mortgage credit in tract R as reﬂected by the ratio of loan
applications (APPS) to UNITS, and Z is a vector of non-racial variables explaining










As Johnston (1984) shows, the OLS estimator for the model estimating supply becomes:
BASE (5)
However, due to non-zero correlations between the disturbance term and explanatory
factors in the model, the following condition holds:
BASE (6)
As a result, the estimates in the estimated supply of mortgages equation are biased. To
explore these issues empirically, we ﬁrst estimate a single-equation model of mortgage
credit ﬂows that is similar in construct to Holmes and Horvitz and then we estimate a
simultaneous model of demand and supply. We are then able to examine the effect of race
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To illustrate the kinds of problems encountered in studies of mortgage credit ﬂows, we
present the results from our own statistical analysis that tests for mortgage redlining in
the Washington, DC MSA. We estimate several versions of these models to show how
easily differing results about redlining can be obtained. The base case model features a
single-equation model that includes only a few key census tract variables—often the only
ones used. We contrast the results from this model to a more complete single-equation
version. Finally, we compare the results from a single-equation approach to those from a
simultaneous equation model of mortgage loan demand and supply.
The dependent variable for the single-equation models is the ratio of originations to
salable properties. This follows the convention of previous studies such as Holmes and
Horvitz, and Perle, Lynch and Horner. We combine 1990 Census and 1992 HMDA data
for the Washington, DC MSA. We conﬁne our sample to mortgages for the purchase (not
reﬁnancing) of one- to four-family homes. We include both conventional and government
(VA and FHA) loans, as our interest is in measuring all mortgage credit ﬂows to the
census tracts. Our ﬁnal sample included 633 census tracts, representing 40, 419 loans and
applications. A list of variable deﬁnitions is found in Exhibit 1.
The analysis features three different model speciﬁcations. Our ﬁrst reduced-form
model includes median income, median home price, and percent black residents as
independent variables to explain the ratio of loan originations to total salable units in a
census tract. The second reduced-form model extends the simple model by adding a
number of variables characterizing the neighborhood, such as census tract loan-to-value
ratio, unemployment rate and rental rate, among others. This approach follows Holmes
and Horvitz’s attempt to control for various demand-side factors that the simple model
does not consider.
The third model features the simultaneous estimation of demand and supply of
mortgage credit. While we retain the dependent variable for supply, we deﬁne demand
slightly differently as in equation 2a. Deﬁning demand in terms of a mortgage application
rate is broadly consistent with Rachlis and Yezer’s conceptual simultaneous framework
for mortgage credit ﬂows. Since the estimated form of this model represents the ﬁrst




PBLK Percent of residents in a census tract that are black
INCOME Median neighborhood income ($000s)
INCOME2 INCOME squared
LTV Tract median loan-to-value ratio
VACANCY Tract vacancy rate
BOARD Tract percentage of boarded-up property
UNEMP Tract unemployment rate
RENTAL Tract percentage of rental units
INMIG Tract percentage in-migration 1989–90
AGE Tract median age of residents
LOAN Median tract loan amount ($000s)appearance of such a model in the literature, a discussion of the exact speciﬁcation is
warranted.




In this conﬁguration, we include the percent black variable in both the demand and
supply equations. Holding constant all relevant factors, a negative coefﬁcient on PBLK in
the supply equation would be consistent with mortgage redlining. The sign on PBLK in
the demand equation is uncertain. For instance, a positive coefﬁcient may reﬂect
increased lender outreach to meet CRA commitments. Information asymmetries may
provide an alternative explanation for such a result. If minority borrowers are less able to
assess the likelihood of obtaining a loan from a lender, they may apply more frequently.
A negative coefﬁcient associated with PBLK might be a sign that blacks are discouraged
from applying for loans.
A number of other independent variables appear in both equations. Some of these
reﬂect characteristics of prospective applicants such as median home price and income.
Others reﬂect economic or physical condition of the neighborhood such as the
unemployment rate, vacancy rate, and percent boarded-up property. The decision to
apply for a loan is in part a function of the ﬁnancial proﬁle of the applicant. However,
variables such as the vacancy rate and unemployment rate control for underlying strength
of loan demand. For example, a high vacancy rate could reﬂect weak demand simply
based on the limited availability of housing stock for purchase in the area.
These same variables could have a very different interpretation in the supply equation.
For example, employment of prospective borrowers is a legitimate underwriting criterion
as is borrower income and LTV. However, as indicated by Munnell, Browne, McEneaney,
and Tootell (1992), redlining might also occur if factors reﬂecting neighborhood
condition such as percent boarded-up property or vacancy rate are used in the
underwriting process. The authors in that study ﬁrst estimated models explaining loan
rejection rates including neighborhood condition variables. Their model showed that
higher vacancy rates and percent boarded-up property were associated with higher
rejection rates, an effect that might indicate redlining based on neighborhood condition.
However, when variables representing the economic characteristics of the loan applicants
were included, the neighborhood effects were no longer signiﬁcant, suggesting that
lenders do not redline by neighborhood condition. We include such variables in the
supply equation.
Several variables appear in one equation but not the other. Neighborhood LTV is one
such variable. In this case it is used to gauge the ability to put up a downpayment for a
mortgage by applicants in a neighborhood. The inclusion of the percent rental variable
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hoods with high percentages of rental units may have less demand for mortgages simply
because there are fewer available units for sale. The in-migration variable is included on
the demand side to reﬂect demographic changes that would tend to affect demand.
Median age of the neighborhood is also hypothesized to be a demand factor.
For completeness, we close the structural model by including demand in the supply
equation, and supply in the demand equation. According to the order condition, both
equations are identiﬁed.
Mortgage Characteristics in Washington
Exhibit 2 shows far fewer institutions serve predominantly black neighborhoods than
other areas, but it does not mean that ﬁrms avoid originating loans in black tracts. Also,
loan application numbers are much lower in black neighborhoods, which could be supply
or demand driven. There is, for example, ample difference in the characteristics of the
neighborhoods. Vacancy rates, percent boarded-up properties, and unemployment rates
are considerably higher in black areas. Black areas also experienced less in-migration
between 1989 and 1990 than did other areas, a factor that might lower demand for loans
in these areas relative to non-black census tracts. Loan acceptance rates are markedly
lower in black neighborhoods. This result could reﬂect differences in the risk proﬁles of
prospective borrowers residing in these areas. Alternatively, it could reﬂect redlining.
Univariate statistics provide little information about this issue
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Exhibit 2
Summary Statistics by Firm and Neighborhood
Commercial Mortgage
Banks Thrifts Companies
Black Non-Black Black Non-Black Black Non-Black
Variable Tracts Tracts Tracts Tracts Tracts Tracts
Number of ﬁrms 30 103 15 58 10 45
VACANCY (%) 8.69 5.50 6.63 5.19 6.87 5.35
INCOME ($) 37,160 63,664 41,287 65,577 43,919 58,767
LTV (%) 73.02 67.54 68.10 73.61 77.39 71.05
RENTAL (%) 44.68 25.67 38.19 25.17 31.88 29.12
BOARD (%) 1.76 .09 1.26 .11 1.22 .10
UNEMP (%) 7.88 2.74 6.66 2.63 6.11 2.84
INMIG (%) 17.53 21.08 16.97 20.12 16.57 23.41
Acceptance rate (%) 80.58 92.86 67.86 92.15 67.80 87.10
Average applications
per ﬁrm (#) 20.6 218.37 8.93 267.21 17.7 343.04
LOAN ($) 73,737 144,036 70,392 161,052 82.773 136.328Empirical Results
Single-Equation Results
The results from the reduced-form single-equation models are reported in Exhibit 3.
The ﬁrst two columns of Exhibit 3 show the results from the simple model. In our second
speciﬁcation of the simple model, we substituted an indicator variable on whether the
census tract is predominantly black (more than 75%) for the percent black to test for
differences between under-served areas and other neighborhoods. The results from this
model are similar to the ﬁnding of the previous model, i.e., the ratio of originations to
salable units in black neighborhoods is signiﬁcantly lower than in non-black areas. The
results from these two simple models, without further analysis, would lead to the
conclusion that redlining exists in the Washington, DC area. However, this simplistic
approach has several statistical problems.
This simple single reduced-form statistical model cannot separate out demand- versus
supply-side reasons for mortgage ﬂows, which may contribute to the ﬁnding of redlining.
The model also omits important census tract information that could reﬂect demand-side
effects. To remedy the latter deﬁciency, we add several census tract-level variables to the
model, similar to those used in several of the studies described above. We include the
following: median loan-to-value ratio (LTV),1 which on the demand side might proxy for
a borrower’s relative ability to come up with a downpayment, and on the supply side
proxy as a measure of risk, as LTV is a key indicator of mortgage performance in default
studies; the unemployment rate and percent rentals, which might reﬂect demand for
mortgages; and the percent of boarded-up housing and vacancy rate variables as possible
controls on neighborhood condition (Campbell and Dietrich, 1983; Holloway,
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Exhibit 3
Single-Equation Estimation†
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 51.55* 35.50* 138.14* 137.16* 141.78*
No. of Salable properties .131* .133*
Percent black 2.551* 2.011 .001
Median home price .0001* .0001*
Median income 2.0013* 2.0011* 28.443* 28.322* 29.214*
Black neighborhood 245.47* 22.427
LTV 2.344* 2.339* 2.361*
VACANT .417* .419*
AGE .016 .034
RENT 2.096* 2.094* 2.110*
BOARD 2.714** 2.662**
UNEMP 2.758* 2.706* 2.676*
INMIG .396* .389* .496*
Loan amount 21.946 22.427 2.604
Adjusted R2 .49 .49 .37 .37 .36
†Dependent variable for columns 1 and 25Total Originations
Dependent variable for columns 3, 4 & 55Originations/Salable Units
*, **signiﬁcant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectivelyMacDonald and Straka, 1993). The results from this speciﬁcation are found in columns
3–5 of Exhibit 3.
Many of the added explanatory variables in the expanded regression model are
signiﬁcant and have the anticipated sign. The LTV ratio is inversely associated with
mortgage credit ﬂows. The unemployment rate and percent rental variables are signiﬁcant
and have negative effects. We ﬁnd that the percentage black and black neighborhood
indicator variables are no longer statistically signiﬁcant when we add census tract
variables. This more complete speciﬁcation follows similar models used by Holmes and
Horvitz, and Perle, Lynch and Horner, and produces similar results.
As indicated earlier, separating demand and supply effects of some of the tract
characteristics variables in a single-equation model is problematic, particularly as it
relates to the interpretation of redlining. To deal with this, we reestimate the expanded
model, this time excluding the vacancy rate and percent of boarded-up property factors
that could have both supply and demand effects. The percent black variable did not
become signiﬁcant after the two variables were omitted.
A Simultaneous Equations Model of Mortgage Flows
Finally, we estimate a simultaneous equation model of mortgage demand and supply
using two-stage least squares. The measure of demand is the ratio of mortgage
applications to total salable units. Supply is deﬁned, as before, as the ratio of originations
to total salable units. By estimating separate models, we can examine the effects that
variables may have on both demand and supply. The results from this estimation are
found in Exhibit 4.
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Exhibit 4
Simultaneous Model of Mortgage Origination in Washington, DC†
Variable Demand Supply
Intercept 2.1525** 2.2206**
Percent black .0144* 2.0176*
Median home price .0060 .0099
Median income 2.4745* .1742**
Median income squared .1481* 2.0665**
LTV .0819
Vacancy rate 2.0072 2.0070
Percent rentals 2.0600*
Percent boarded-up property .0016 .0001
Unemployment rate 2.0124 .0193**







*, **signiﬁcant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively; N5633.In the simultaneous equations model, we ﬁnd on the demand side that as the
percentage of black households in a neighborhood rises, the ratio of mortgage
applications to salable units rises as well. This result could reﬂect, among other things,
more aggressive marketing by lenders in minority areas or that minority applicants face
greater uncertainty or arbitrariness in loan decisions and compensate by applying more
frequently. By contrast, the results from the supply equation show that originations drop
in neighborhoods as the percentage of black residents rises. This result could reﬂect
redlining, or it could reﬂect an omitted variables problem (no creditworthiness data).
Several authors have noted that omitting factors such as credit history may be correlated
with the race variable and hence, yield biased estimates of the race coefﬁcient (Horne,
1994; Schill and Wachter, 1993; Perle, Lynch and Horner, 1993). In either case, without
additional information, we are unable to determine the cause of these ﬁndings.
Thus, whle the extended single-equation model found no signiﬁcant effect from the
percent black variable, the simultaneous equation model suggests that loan supply is
negatively associated with racial composition. The result from the single-equation model
may in fact reﬂect the offsetting effects of racial composition in the demand and supply
equations. Hence, the results from a single-equation model are not reliable indicators of
redlining or its absence. Yet even the simultaneous model does not provide deﬁnitive
evidence of redlining, as those results may be caused primarily by differences in
individual credit histories, as in the Munnell et al., Boston study.
Conclusion
Our statistical analysis of the Washington, DC MSA illustrates the hazards associated
with using single-equation models of mortgage credit ﬂows to examine racial redlining. A
simple model can show the presence of redlining, while a more complete single-equation
model that adds additional variables to correct some deﬁciencies does not. A further
reﬁnement—a simultaneous equations model with separate demand and supply
equations—leads to another reversal by suggesting potential redlining practice. However,
even this result requires further investigation using credit history information or default
rates as additional explanatory variables.
A major drawback of all aggregate credit ﬂow models is that they focus exclusively on
the neighborhood and not the individual borrower and lender. Ultimately, it is the
dynamics of the mortgage market and the participants, both borrower and lender, that
determine lending outcomes.
The use of statistical models of mortgage credit ﬂows to test for racial redlining is a
worthwhile but risky endeavor. The danger comes from either concluding that racial
redlining exists when it does not, or concluding that racial redlining does not exist when
it does. To underscore this point, we showed that alternative speciﬁcation of the
underlying mortage market can lead to completely different conclusions about racial
redlining. Our analysis shows how precarious the results derived from statistical models
can be in showing the presence or absence of racial redlining. And the costs of
misidentifying racial redlining are not inconsequential both to borrowers when we fail to
ﬁnd a bias when it exists, and to lenders when we ﬁnd evidence of bias when it does not
exist.
22 THE JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1, 1996Note
1We calculated median LTV as the ratio of the median loan amount originated in a census tract to
the census tract’s median home price.
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